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Shady Grove on the Bayou: Louisiana’s Procedural
Limitations on Legacy Oil Suits in a post-Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.
Landscape
INTRODUCTION
The application of state procedure in federal courts ceased to be
a simple question decades ago. Where a federal court, sitting in
diversity, must apply the law of the state in which the court sits, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate the manner and means of
adjudicating and enforcing state-created rights and remedies. State
legislatures exacerbate this complexity by using procedural rules as
a means of regulation, without appreciating that these regulatoryprocedural rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may
collide.
This Comment examines one such procedural limitation enacted
by the Louisiana Legislature: the limited admission of newly minted
article 1563 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Article 1563
was enacted in response to lawsuits over environmental damage to
land caused by generations of oil industry operations, more
commonly known as legacy litigation. Article 1563(A)(1) allows a
defendant to admit liability for environmental remediation damages,
but limits the admission to only that one aspect of the plaintifflandowner’s claim, and only for the purpose of funding an
environmental remediation plan. The new article’s survival in
federal court is important, as the defendant will be responsible for
attorney’s fees if found liable. Thus, by providing this procedural
escape hatch, the legislature allows a defendant to effectively end
further cost recoupment, ultimately discouraging landowners from
advancing trial on other theories of recovery.
Part I of this Comment examines the Louisiana law before
Corbello v. Iowa Production.1 This Comment then discusses the
Corbello decision, its economic impact, and the Louisiana
Legislature’s reforms to date. Next, Part II provides a brief overview
of state procedure displacement by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and discusses recent cases on this issue. Finally, in Part
III, this Comment discusses Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1563(A)(1) and its direct conflict with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. This Comment concludes by asserting that,
following the analysis of Shady Grove, state tort law reform
Copyright 2013, by BRIAN LINDSEY.
1. 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
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measures will need to either modify state substantive law or risk
displacement in the federal forum.
I. THE LEGACY PROBLEM: PUBLIC HARM, PRIVATE RECOVERY
A. The law before Corbello v. Iowa Production
Louisiana’s civilian tradition prefers specific performance over
monetary damages for the failure to perform an obligation.2 The
principal right of an aggrieved obligor is specific performance, with
an accessory right to recover damages.3 The principle remedy in
Louisiana,4 specific performance, focuses on restoring the obligee to
its original position, while also avoiding the imposition of an undue
burden on the obligor.5 This avoidance of undue burden on the
obligor was interpreted as a limitation of private property
environmental damage claims to the fair market value of
uncontaminated land, and ignored the cost of environmental
remediation ultimately borne by the private landowner.6 This is in
accord with the general rule for an award of damages for breach of
an obligation; where damages are awarded, the award should not be
excessively burdensome on a party “who, in good faith, might not
have contemplated such an extensive liability at the time of entering
into the contract.”7 Louisiana’s legislative enactments prefer
limiting damages to principles of “enrichment, diminution in value,
and fair market value.”8 Punitive damages are available only if
statutorily imposed9 or contained in the parties’ contract.10 In

2. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1986 (2013).
3. SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS §1.7, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 15 (2d ed. 2012).
4. Id.
5. Mary Beth Balhoff, Corbello v. Iowa Production and the Implications of
Restoration Damages in Louisiana: Drilling Holes in Deep Pockets for ThirtyThree Million Dollars, 65 LA. L. REV. 271, 277 (2004).
6. See Id. at 271 (“Therefore, damages would equal the value of the thing,
not the cost to rebuild or restore the thing.”).
7. LITVINOFF, supra note 3, § 14.8, at 442.
8. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 279.
9. See Breaux v. Taylor, No. 06–1145, 2007 WL 1580077, at *1 (W.D. La.
May 29, 2007); Albert v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 940 So. 2d 620, 622 (La. 2006);
Int’l Harvester Credit Corp., v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988); Ricard v.
State, 390 So. 2d 882, 886 (La. 1980); Alexander v. Burroughs Corp., 359 So. 2d
607, 610–11 (La. 1978); Killebrew v. Abbott Laboratories, 359 So. 2d 1275, 1278
(La. 1978).
10. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1983 (2013) (“Contracts have the effect of law
for the parties . . . .”).
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contrast, other jurisdictions reduce damages to the probable loss in
value, seeking economic efficiency.11
Louisiana courts had awarded surface restoration damages for
decades even though these costs were minor compared to
contemporary environmental remediation damage awards.12
Essentially, where restoration costs exceed actual value of the land,
damages follow a simple formula: replacement costs less
reasonable depreciation.13 However, there was a countervailing
argument based on economics: immunizing industry actors from
the true costs of their conduct would result in an industry
unmindful of safety and environmental controls, if those controls
pose a more expensive alternative than eventual anticipated
remediation costs.14 This lack of accountability permitted
Louisiana’s oil and gas industry to enjoy “decades of financial
success . . . while disregarding the effects of their operations on the
fragile landscape.”15
The opening act in this drama was a suit by the New Orleans
Archdiocese following a fire at a low-income family housing unit it
managed.16 There, the Louisiana Supreme Court held property
damages are not limited to the fair market value of the property,
where an owner has a personal reason to restore the property such
that there is reason to believe the plaintiff will make the repairs.17 In
Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(b) (1981) (“If a
breach results in defective or unfinished construction and the loss in value to the
injured party is not proved with sufficient certainty, he may recover damages
based on . . . the reasonable cost of completing performance or of remedying the
defects if that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value to
him.”); see also Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 113
(Okla. 1962) (“[T]he ‘relative economic benefit’ is a proper consideration here.”).
The Louisiana Civil Code allows similar remedies where obligations arise without
agreement between the parties where there is enrichment without cause. LA. CIV.
CODE. ANN. art. 2298 (2013) (“The amount of compensation due is measured by
the extent to which one is enriched or the other has been impoverished whichever
is less.”).
12. See, e.g., Smith v. Schuster, 66 So. 2d 430 (La. Ct. App. 1953).
13. See, e.g., Nippert v. Baton Rouge Railcar Services, Inc., 526 So. 2d 824,
827 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
14. Kenneth M. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act: Current
Law and Needed Revisions, 71 LA. L. REV. 917, 938 (2011).
15. Ryan M. Seidemann, Louisiana Wetlands and Water Law: Recent
Jurisprudence and Post-Katrina and Rita Imperatives, 51 LOY. L. REV. 861, 874–
75 (2005) (stating that the industry should be held accountable for “decades of
financial success . . . enjoyed while disregarding the effects of their operations on
the fragile landscape.”).
16. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans v. La. Gas
Serv. Co., 618 So. 2d 874, 875 (La. 1993).
17. Id. at 880.
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Louisiana Gas Service Company, the New Orleans Archdiocese
purchased an apartment complex from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD or Department).18 The purchase
imposed an obligation on the Archdiocese to maintain the complex
for two hundred low-income families for at least fifteen years, or the
property would revert to the Department’s control.19 Following
extensive renovations, a fire on the property gutted one of the
buildings.20 The gas supplier admitted liability, but contested
damages.21
The trial court found that, as the restoration costs exceeded the
market value of the property, the Archdiocese’s recovery was
limited to market value, less depreciation.22 The Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed and awarded full restoration costs, finding that the
Archdiocese could not comply with its obligation to the HUD if the
award was tethered to the property’s fair market value.23 Noting the
Archdiocese’s obligation could only be fulfilled by providing lowincome housing to two hundred low-income families on the
property, the Court found that where the property was used for a
personal purpose to the owner, damages, including restoration costs,
may exceed the market value of the property.24 Despite the Roman
Catholic Church holding, later decisions clarified that mere
assertions of personal attachment with plans of future development
do not justify an award in excess of market value.25
Roman Catholic Church did not involve an individual private
landowner, but a religious organization conducting charitable
activities. There, the defendant gas company was required to pay
restoration costs for a reasonably foreseeable loss due to its own
negligence. Environmental remediation costs were arguably not as
foreseeable to Louisiana industry and not based on a specific
tortious act. This next section will discuss Louisiana’s courts
applying the reasoning of Roman Catholic Church to a case
brought by a private landowner alleging decades of environmental
damages and the defendant’s breach of a contractual obligation to
restore the land’s surface.
18. Roman Catholic Church, 618 So. 2d at 875.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 875–76.
23. Id. at 880.
24. See id.
25. Hornsby v. Bayou Jack Logging, 902 So. 2d 361, 367–68 (La. 2005)
(reversing trial court award of restoration damages under manifest error standard
where the plaintiff put forth evidence of significant emotional ties to the land, but
only plans for future development).
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B. The Corbello Decision
Attracting fourteen amicus briefs, Corbello v. Iowa Production
applied the rule of Roman Catholic Church to the oil and gas
industry, allowing landowners recovery for environmental
remediation damages to the tune of $33 million.26 Described as
having sent “shock waves throughout the legal profession and the oil
and gas community,”27 Corbello is hardly a radical departure from
prior law given Roman Catholic Church. Roman Catholic Church
simply left the courthouse door unsecure, and a South Louisiana
family was willing to finish the job.
In 1929, the Heyd family granted a lease to Shell Oil Company,
who operated the lease until 1985, when it sold the lease to
Rosewood Resources, Inc., though Shell continued to operate
facilities on the property.28 The surface lease expired in May of
1991, but Shell remained on the land for twenty-two additional
months.29 The landowners brought suit in May of 1992, seeking
damages for trespass to land, unauthorized disposal of salt water,
and “for the poor condition of the lease premises.”30 In May 2000,
the jury found Shell liable to restore the property to its original, prelease condition and awarded $33 million in environmental
remediation damages.31 Louisiana’s Third Circuit Court of Appeal
affirmed the environmental damages and increased the award of
attorney fees and other damages.32
Louisiana’s Supreme Court rejected Shell’s contention that
restoration damages need be reasonably or rationally related to the
actual land value of $108,000.33 The court took notice that the
contract, as the law between the parties, required Shell to restore the
property to its pre-lease condition, and that if Shell wanted to limit
its liability to the market value of the property “it could have
bargained for such.”34
While the court noted that it is sometimes logical to balance the
amount owed by a negligent tortfeasor against the cost to restore the
26. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 691 (La. 2003).
27. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 271.
28. Corbello, 850 So. 2d 686, 691.
29. Id. at 708.
30. Id. at 690–91.
31. Id. at 691.
32. Id. at 692 (affirming the $33 million to restore the land and $16 million
for illegal disposal of salt water, increasing attorney fees award from $689,510 to
$4 million, reversing the trial court’s remittitur of $927,000 for failure to vacate
the leased premises, and reversing and remanding the trial court’s dismissal of
claim for exemplary damages).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 694.
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injured plaintiff, the court reasoned that this balancing should not
extend to a suit for a breach of contract.35 Balancing was not needed
where the party was a sophisticated oil company seeking to “alter
the terms of this contract” to limit its liability.36 If it were to tether
remediation damages to property value, the Court “would give
license to oil companies to perform its operations in any manner,
with indifference as to the aftermath of its operations because of the
assurance that it would not be responsible for the full cost of
restoration.”37 The Court found that tethering damages to the market
value of the property would grant a windfall to the oil companies.38
The Court specifically rejected Shell’s argument that a private
landowner should not be awarded remediation damages when there
is no mechanism to ensure that the money is actually used to
remediate the property.39
In Corbello, the court’s decision was strengthened by two policy
concerns. The first concern was contaminated land with a potential
for public impact. This public injury to the local water supply
potentially affects entire communities. The second was discouraging
landowners from bringing private actions, which would leave only
“understaffed and underfunded state agencies” to “oppose oil
companies.”40 The court reasoned that, while allowing recovery to
the private landowner does not guarantee the land will be
decontaminated, it was unlikely that oil companies would clean up
land absent the State’s coercion.41
C. Corbello’s Impact
In Corbello, private landowners recovered monetary damages
after their land—surface, subsurface, and groundwater—was
contaminated by hazardous materials.42 For the first time, the
Louisiana Supreme Court allowed the landowners to recover those
environmental damages without tethering them to the market value
of the property.43 Even though the court reasoned a windfall would
have gone to either the landowners or the oil company, the court’s
35. Id. at 695.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 699.
40. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 39 (La. 2008)
(Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson is also the author of the Corbello
opinion.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 38.
43. Id.
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selection of the landowners as windfall recipients (who were, after
all, now in possession of toxic land due to the actions of defendants
who profited from the activity)44 subjected the court to criticism
from commentators.45
The economic impact of Corbello may be connected to the
comparative stagnation of energy industry activity in South
Louisiana for the past decade.46 While energy operations in the
state’s northern parishes have been strong due to the development of
unconventional shale resources, conventional drilling in Louisiana
lags behind Louisiana’s own historical trends and other major
energy producing states.47 This unconventional production in North
Louisiana is welcome; however, Louisiana risks becoming
“exceptionally dependent” on this unconventional resource
development.48
Prior to 2000, drilling in Louisiana “was comparable and
competitive with other major oil and gas producing states,” but
“activity has fallen considerably since that time.”49 Though the
Corbello obligation to restore the land to its pre-lease condition only
arose by contract,50 the “strong perception that Louisiana is a
litigious state that subjects producers (past and current)” to
“significant legal obstacles” has contributed to Louisiana being seen
as “an increasingly difficult place for conventional oil and gas
producers to operate.”51
One study, authored by David E. Dismukes, PhD., of Louisiana
State University’s Center for Energy Studies, found “an important
and statistically significant deterioration in state drilling activity
since the inception of the legacy lawsuits.”52 This study argued that
Corbello and its progeny cost the state nearly $10.5 billion in lost
economic output.53 The Dismukes study further asserts that legacy
44. Corbello, 850 So.2d at 695.
45. See Balhoff, supra note 5, at 293-94.
46. David E. Dismukes, LSU Center for Energy Studies, The Impact of
Legacy Lawsuits on Conventional Oil and Gas Drilling Louisiana 2 (2012),
http://www.enrg.lsu.edu/files/images/presentations/2012/DISMUKES_LEGACY_
RPT_02-28-12_FINAL.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id. at 23.
50. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 800–
01 (La. 2005) (concluding that the Louisiana Mineral Code, “in the absence of an
express lease provision[,] . . . does not impose an implied duty to restore the
surface to its original, pre-lease condition absent proof that the lessee has
exercised his rights under the lease unreasonably or excessively.”). Id. at 801.
51. Dismukes, supra note 45, at 3.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 5.
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lawsuits have had a “severe impact” on Louisiana industry, as
“Louisiana’s poor legal climate toward the oil and gas industry is
causing the state to lose out on substantial conventional drilling
opportunities and thousands of well-paying jobs to other states.”54
Some have criticized this study as built on a foundation of oil
industry polling data,55 though the Louisiana Oil and Gas
Association denies funding or requesting the study.56 Academic
criticism of the study was submitted to a joint session of the
Louisiana House and Senate Committees on Natural Resources.57 In
a memorandum, Professor Whitelaw, an Economist from the
University of Oregon, described Dr. Dismukes’ study as “fatally
flawed, both theoretically and empirically.”58 Specifically, Professor
Whitelaw criticizes Dr. Dismukes use of industry data only through
2007 and not accounting for the disruptive effect by hurricanes in
2005 and 2006.59
At that same hearing, Joseph Frost of Hilcorp Energy testified
that legacy litigation has changed their business operations.60 Before
Corbello, Hilcorp would purchase oil fields from prior operators,
assuming the obligation to restore the surface from the prior
operator.61 Hilcorp now signs new leases expressly disavowing
liability for any prior environmental damage.62 Thus, contemporary
operators are contractually negating future liability from the decades
of environmental damage, allegedly caused by prior operators.
54. Statement of Chris John, President, La. Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Assoc.,
on LSU Study on Negative Economic Impact of Legacy Cites Litigation (Feb. 28,
2012), http://www.lmoga.com/assets/LMOGA_Statement_-_LSU_Study_on_Leg
acy_Suits.pdf.
55. Mike Staff, Op-Ed Response to LOGA, LOUISIANA TRUTH.ORG (Mar. 20,
2012), http://louisianatruth.org/?p=228.
56. Kyle Barnett, Plaintiff Attorney Seeks to Depose LSU Researcher Who
Authored ‘Legacy Lawsuits’ Study, LEGAL NEWSLINE LEGAL JOURNAL (Mar. 28,
2012, 12:23 PM) (statement of Don Briggs of the Louisiana Oil and Gas
Association), http://legalnewsline.com/in-the-spotlight/235638-plaintiff-attorney seeks-to-depose-lsu-researcher-who-authored-legacy-lawsuits-study.
57. Discussion of the Effects of and Potential Changes to Act 312 of the 2006
Regular Session, Hearing before the Joint H. & S. Comm. On Natural Resources,
2012 Reg. Sess. (4/16/12).
58. Memorandum from Dr. Ed Whitelaw and Dr. Bryce Ward, EcoNorthwest,
to Mr. Robert Gardes, Review of the Dismukes Analysis 1 (Apr. 15, 2012) (on file
with LSU Journal of Energy Law and Resources).
59. Id. at 1–2.
60. Discussion of the Effects of and Potential Changes to Act 312 of the 2006
Regular Session, Hearing before the Joint H. & S. Comm. On Natural Resources,
2012 Reg. Sess. (4/16/12) (statement of Joseph Frost, Executive of HilCorp
Energy).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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These evolving business practices militate against the projected
impact of legacy litigation on future mineral exploration and
production in Louisiana.63
Corbello highlighted two “meaningful disincentives” to
encourage prudent oil production operations: regulatory sanction
and suits by the landowner.64 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
however, labeled the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
(“LDNR”) as “understaffed and underfunded”;65 thus the only
practical disincentives are suits by the private landowner. The next
step in the legacy litigation saga would be a response from the
legislature. When the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Corbello
and held deep-pocketed industrial defendants accountable, the
Louisiana legislature heeded the call to action on behalf of industry.
D. The 2003 Louisiana Legislative Response and its Impact
At the time of Corbello, the Louisiana Oilfield Site Restoration
Law66 did not offer a “comprehensive solution to the problem of
oilfield waste sites.”67 Landowners could seek environmental
remediation damages, and as in traditional tort doctrine, “there was
no statutory mandate which required landowners to actually use the
damages awarded to implement remediation or restoration.”68 The
legislative response was the enactment of legislation to address this
very issue.69
In 2003, the Louisiana legislature passed the “usable ground
water-remediation” statute70 to “cure the problems caused by the
Corbello decision.”71 The legislative intent was for environmental
remediation damage awards to have a public benefit by requiring the
63. These business practices also may result in more legacy litigation arriving
in federal court by way of diversity jurisdiction. By releasing the current producer,
the landowner may find himself completely diverse from prior lessees. Prior
operators may be out of state companies or no longer considered citizens of
Louisiana for diversity of citizenship purposes.
64. Gladstone N. Jones III & Andrew Jacoby, Recent Developments in
Oilfield Pollution Lawsuits, TULANE LAW SCHOOL SUMMIT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW & POLICY 2 (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.law.tulane.edu/uploadedFiles
/Student_Org_Sites/Tulane_Environmental_Law_Conference/Fri%20200pm%20
Sabine%20-%20Glad%20Jones%20Article.pdf.
65. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 39 (La. 2008).
66. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:80−30:101 (2007).
67. M.J. Farms, 998 So. 2d at 38 (Johnson, J., concurring).
68. Id.
69. Act No. 1166, 2003 La. Acts 3511 (codified at LA REV. STAT. ANN. §
30:2015.1 (2003) (amended in 2006)).
70. Id.
71. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299.
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landowner to clean up the site and prevent future environmental
damages.72 The act required the landowner to notify the LDNR and
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality when the suit is
filed.73 Further, where the court finds that the polluter is liable and
that contamination is threatening usable ground water, the court
“shall order” the development of a remediation plan.74
Consideration is also given to any plan submitted by the plaintiff.75
The court then determines which plan is most feasible and orders the
responsible party “to fund implementation of the plan” and to
deposit the funds with the court.76
An issue arose concerning the prospect of “double damages”:
would an industry defendant be forced to pay remediation damages
to a private landowner (damage number one), and then face
additional liability (damage number two) in a remediation suit or
regulatory action brought by the LDNR? The legislature addressed
this issue by giving the “oil companies a credit for amounts paid to
the landowner in a subsequent enforcement action.”77 However, the
act applied only where landowners claimed groundwater
contamination damages,78 encouraging artful pleading by
landowners.79 The act did not tether remediation damages to
property value or balance remediation costs against economic
benefit allowing restoration damages perceived by some as
unreasonable.80
E. The Legislative Response: Act 312 of 2006
In the 2006 Regular Session, the Legislature of Louisiana passed
Act 312,81 which one commenter described as “reforming the
procedure in litigation claiming environmental damages arising
from oilfield operations.”82 Act 312 contained six components
72. Act No. 1166, 2003 La. Acts 3511; M.J. Farms, 998 So. 2d at 39.
73. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B).
74. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(C)(1) (2003) (amended in 2006).
75. Id.
76. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(C)(3) (2003) (amended 2006).
77. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686, 699 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:89.1 (2003) (amended 2006)).
78. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299.
79. See, e.g., Frank C. Minvielle, L.L.C. v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380
F. Supp. 2d 755 (W.D. La. 2004); Duhé v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d 1070 (La. Ct.
App. 2001); Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299.
80. Balhoff, supra note 5, at 299–300.
81. Act No. 312, 2006 La. Acts 1472.
82. Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 347, 347 (2007).
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implemented to protect the public interest in legacy litigation.83
Specifically, (1) the state must receive timely notice of the
litigation;84 (2) proceedings are stayed until after notice is given;85
(3) the state is permitted to intervene;86 (4) the LDNR determines
the environmental damage and most feasible remediation plan;87 (5)
the LDNR is to oversee the implementation of that plan;88 and (6)
the act allows recovery of attorney and expert fees.89 A commenter
observed that Act 312 did not address “claims that are nonoilfield
and do not allege damage to usable ground water.”90
The court shall adopt the plan adopted by the LDNR unless a
party proves that another plan is more feasible by a preponderance
of the evidence.91 Act 312 requires the court to order those legally
responsible to fund the implementation of the remediation plan92 by
depositing those funds into the registry of the court,93 subject to dual
oversight by the court and the LDNR.94
Though the Act is “generally perceived as adverse to the
landowner community,” several sections arguably protect the rights
and benefits of the landowner.95 Act 312 specifically states that it
does not impede private contractual agreements obligating a party to
remediate the site beyond state regulatory requirements.96 The
legislation is to have no effect on environmental damage claims not
subject to remediation damage,97 and costs and attorney fees are
recoverable by the victorious landowner.98 Parties are not free to
compromise their claims without court approval, and even where
settled, the remediation costs are deposited with the court.99 This
requirement could be waived if the settlements was a “minimal

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
353.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 350.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(1) (2013).
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(2) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(E) (2013).
Pitre, supra note 83, at 351.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(5) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D) (2013); see also Pitre, supra note 83, at
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(D)(1) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(F) (2013).
Pitre, supra note 83, at 353.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(H) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(E)(1) (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(J)(1) (2013).
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amount and is not dispositive of the entire litigation,”100 but what
exactly constituted a minimal amount was not defined.101
Act 312 succeeded in lengthening and increasing the cost of
litigation,102 added a layer of understaffed bureaucracy, and
“generally discouraged such suits from being filed.”103 Act 312
failed in “its ostensible purpose of getting more of these sites
cleaned up.”104 In fact, “[s]ince the enactment of Act 312, very few
cases have made it through the Act 312 process.”105 Though
Louisiana based industry has adapted to the new operational
environment,106 the legislature again took up the task of legacy
litigation reform in 2012. These recent enactments are discussed in
the next section.
F. The Compromise: Acts 754 and 779 of 2012
The 2012 legislative response to the ongoing legacy litigation
reformed the procedures for processing legacy lawsuits. The bill’s
intention was to expedite remediation of environmental
contamination to state regulatory standards and foster earlier
resolution of litigated claims.107
House Bill 618, “the oil industry’s solution,”108 enacted as Act
Number 754 of 2012, added article 1563 to the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure.109 Specifically, article 1563(A)(1) allows a party to
make a “limited admission of liability” whereby the “party may
elect to limit this admission of liability for environmental damages”
and “if necessary remediate all or a portion of the contamination.”110
Then, the court refers the case to the LDNR, which, after a public
hearing, structures the most feasible remediation plan and submits it
100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(J)(1) (2013).
101. Pitre, supra note 83, at 354.
102. Jones & Jacoby, supra note 65, at 9.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Claire Juneau, Act 312 – Louisiana Legislature Passes New Measures to
Speed Remediation Process, LOUISIANA LAW BLOG (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www
.louisianalawblog.com/legacy-oil-field-sites-act-312-louisiana-legislature-passesnew-measures-to-speed-remediation-process.html.
106. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
107. La. Act No. 779 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View
Document.aspx?d=812324.
108. Mark Ballard, Committee Backs ‘Legacy’ Bill, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 27,
2012, at 05A, available at http://www.lmoga.com/news/committee-backs-legacybill.
109. La. Act No. 754 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View
Document.aspx?d=812233.
110. Id.

2013]

COMMENT

185

to the court.111 The second enactment, Senate Bill 555, modifies
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29112 to allow for the new
procedural code articles added by Act 754.113
Some have suggested that the legislation allows the remediation
standard to be varied based on the property’s intended use, which
allows the LDNR to circumvent state regulatory levels in
formulating the environmental remediation plan.114 Others have
accused the LDNR of bias and a conflict of interest, based on the
LDNR’s goal of helping the oil industry to extract and produce
revenues.115
These enactments come as a direct result of prior failed attempts
at legacy litigation reform. The previous attempts “failed to live up
to expectations, and it is not clear whether a significant number of
defendants will invoke the procedure authorized by this new
legislation.”116 As of the time of this writing, no court has yet to
apply this newly enacted procedural rule.
G. The Actual Effect of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1563(A)(1)
Article 1563(A)(1) must be read in pari materia with section
30:29. Specifically, section 30:29 provides for the recovery of costs
and fees “[i]n any civil action in which a party is responsible for
damages or payments for the evaluation or remediation of
environmental damage.”117 The recoverable fees and expenses are
“all costs attributable to producing that portion of the evidence that
directly relates to the establishment of environmental damage.”118
Here, environmental damage is any actual or potential damage

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. La. Act No. 779 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View
Document.aspx?d=812324.
114. Press Release, La. Farm Bureau, Louisiana Farm Bureau Concerned over
HB 618 (Apr. 25, 2012), http://web.archive.org/web/20120506124237/http://www
.pressreleasepoint.com/louisiana-farm-bureau-concerned-over-hb-618.
115. Kevin Mooney, Study Alleges Majority of Legacy Lawsuits Fail to Produce
Hard Evidence of Contamination, THE PELICAN POST (Mar. 29, 2012, 11:26 AM),
http://www.thepelicanpost.org/2012/03/29/study-alleges-majority-of-legacy-lawsuits
-fail-to-produce-hard-evidence-of-contamination (quoting Haywood Martin,
Chairman of the Louisiana Chapter of the Sierra Club).
116. New Legislation to Address Legacy Lawsuits in Louisiana, MCGLINCHEY
STAFFORD PLLC (June 14, 2012), http://mcglinchey.com/content
Detail.asp?id=12062.
117. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(E)(1) (2013).
118. Id.
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caused by oilfield exploration or production to soil, surface water,
groundwater, or sediment.119
Therefore, by admitting liability for environmental remediation,
the defendant will effectively extinguish further liability for costs
and attorney’s fees to prove environmental damages. These costs
would otherwise be imposed after a finding of liability to include
costs of taking the case to trial. Section 30:29(E)(1) only provides
for costs specifically for proving environmental remediation. Thus,
to the extent that the landowner has filed suit seeking further
recovery, he may not have a basis to recover costs and attorney fees.
Forced with the loss of his main cause of action, and with the
prospect of further costs and fees being deducted out of a later
recovery, many landowners will dismiss the rest of their claims or
seek settlement on unfavorable terms.
Ironically, by permitting a defendant oil company to escape from
the civil court system and seek refuge behind a state agency, those
defendants facing near certain liability are the most likely to invoke
this procedure. This gives the more egregious defendant lower costs
as compared to one whose liability is not as clear. Also, with fewer
suits proceeding to trial due to the environmental remediation claim
being removed, these defendants ultimately face less ancillary
claims, as would a defendant who chooses to contest the claims to
trial.
The fate of this limited admission is thus a matter of importance
to plaintiff-landowners able to reach federal court.
II. STATE PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL COURT
A. The Not-So Ancient History of the Erie Doctrine
The application of state law in federal courts is governed by the
Erie doctrine. Erie famously held that “except in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in any case is the law of the state.”120 Soon after the Erie
decision, Erie’s simplifications ceased. Erie doctrine problems often
go undetected and unnoticed by courts and litigators unless a party is
willing to delve into the substantive purpose of state procedural
rules. It requires treading into the distinction of substantive law and
procedural rules, a distinction that eludes litigants, stumps scholars,
and lately splinters the normal alliances of the Supreme Court.121
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(1) (2013).
120. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
121. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393 (2010), where Justice Scalia authored the opinion of the court in part I and
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The complex development of the Erie Doctrine is beyond the scope
of this paper.122 Instead, this paper focuses on recent Supreme Court
interpretations where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are at
odds with state legislative use of procedure to advance substantive
policy goals.
In brief, Congress delegated the power to promulgate uniform
rules of federal procedure to the Supreme Court in the Rules
Enabling Act.123 In Sibbach v. Wilson, the Court found the Federal
Rules within the scope of Congress’s delegation.124 Referring to the
language of the Rules Enabling Act, Sibbach found that, in order to
promulgate procedure, the promulgated rule must not “abridge,
enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”125 A rule is
procedural if it regulates “the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress.”126 The Sibbach majority
understood that where a state recognizes a right incompatible with a
Federal Rule, the Federal Rule governs.127
Decisions contemporary with Sibbach held that, where the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not “speak directly and
unmistakably to the exact same matter as the state procedure,” the
collision between state and federal procedure was dodged by narrow
interpretation of the Federal Rules.128 The Court’s decisions of this
period represent the “high-water mark of the Court’s deference to
state procedural rules.”129 Courts were directed to apply federal

II−A, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Thomas, and
Sotomayor. Justice Scalia also penned the plurality opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor as to parts II−B and II−D.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas also joined in part II−C of Justice
Scalia’s opinion. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent, which was joined
by Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito.
122. See Allan Ides, The Supreme Court & the Law to be Applied in Diversity
Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development & Application of the Erie Doctrine &
Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19 (1995).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
124. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941).
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id. at 14.
127. Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the
Confusion—But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1161 (2011).
128. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); see also Margaret S. Thomas,
Constraining the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Through the Federalism
Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 201
(2013).
129. Thomas, supra note 128, at 203.
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procedural law with a high deference to state policy, so the
litigation’s outcome would be substantially the same as if the case
was in state court.130
In 1965, the Court began to turn away from strong deference to
state procedure, instead focusing on Congress’s constitutional power
to set rules of federal procedure and the reach of these rules via the
Rules Enabling Act.131 The fact that a state procedural rule was
actually substantive policy by the state legislature was of no
consequence, so long as the Federal Rule was within congressional
power.132 This echoed the initial simplicity of Sibbach, with the
question squarely set on determining if “a rule really regulates
procedure.”133 However, the Court only shifted the dispute to the
scope of the Federal Rule, allowing later courts to narrowly interpret
the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order to avoid
collision with state procedure.134
One commenter observed that the Court continued to examine
state policy to determine the substantive purpose underlying the
state rule to determine if the state rule spoke to the same issue as the
Federal Rule.135 Spawning further confusion, decisions of statutory
interpretations created different meanings for some Federal Rules,
meanings that varied based on the specific context of the
litigation.136 These decisions led one commentator to argue that the
Supreme Court adopted the following policy: evaluating state policy
rationale to determine the interpretation of Federal Rules, while
avoiding conflict between state and federal procedure.137 The debate
centered on whether a Federal Rule controlled the issue,138 while
avoiding narrow construction of the Federal Rules when the rule’s
plain meaning required otherwise.139
What emerged from the “murky waters”140 was a two-track Erie
analysis. On track one, there existed cases involving a federal rule
130. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
131. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965).
132. Id. at 468 n.9.
133. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
134. Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1642 (1998); Thomas, supra note 128, at 206.
135. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1980); see also
Thomas, supra note 127, at 207.
136. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 & n.4 (1987); see also Stephen P.
Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 702 (1988).
137. Thomas, supra note 128, at 208.
138. Walker, 446 U.S. at 749–50.
139. Id. at 750 n.9.
140. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
398 (2010).
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and a conflicting state rule. In those cases, the federal rule governs
unless it runs afoul of the Enabling Act;141 the Enabling Act, in turn,
prohibits federal procedural rules from abridging, enlarging, or
modifying any substantive right.142 One leading scholar observed
lower courts gave certain Federal Rules “implausibly broad
interpretations in order to apply federal law while emptying the
others of content in order to avoid an Enabling Act challenge.”143
Where there was no federal rule on point, courts would determine if
the state law was “sufficiently substantive in that its application was
required by constitutionally based principles of federalism and
Erie’s policy goals of avoiding, where possible, disparate outcomes
in state and federal court as well as the discouragement of undue
federal-state forum shopping.”144
The disjointed reading of Federal Rules as having variable
meanings based on the context of the suit was ultimately an
untenable position. The Court would have to confront this issue and
decide if the Federal Rules should be read to avoid collision with
state procedural rules advancing substantive state policy, or if
federal procedural rules have a uniform meaning for all litigants.
The case that emerged was Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A.
v. Allstate Insurance Co.145
B. Shady Grove: A Complicated Simplification
The latest case to emerge along Erie’s twisted path, Shady Grove
began with an automobile accident that injured Sonia Galvez,146
who sought medical treatment with Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates. Shady Grove then billed Allstate Insurance Co.147 New
York law gave Allstate thirty days to pay or deny the claim.148
Allstate paid the claim late, and then refused to pay accrued
statutory interest on the overdue payment.149 Shady Grove filed a
diversity suit in the Eastern District of New York to recover the
unpaid interest on behalf of a class of all others owed interest by
Allstate.150 The district court dismissed the suit for lack of
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
143. Burbank, supra note 136, at 18.
144. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Shady Grove and the Potential DemocracyEnhancing Benefits of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV. 907, 923 (2011).
145. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393.
146. Id. at 397.
147. Id.
148. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2009).
149. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397.
150. Id.
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jurisdiction, reasoning that New York Civil Law and Rules Section
901(b), which precludes a class action suit for a statutory penalty
absent express statutory authorization,151 applied in a federal court
diversity suit.152 The Second Circuit affirmed.153
A five-justice majority reversed, finding the suit could proceed
as a class action due to Federal Rule 23 controlling the requirements
for class certification in federal court154 although five justices were
not able to reach a majority on the rationale for the decision.155 The
Scalia plurality refused to search for New York’s purpose, noting
that, in the face of a direct collision between state and federal
procedure, the aspirations of the state legislature should not
determine if a state statute survives preemption.156 Justice Scalia
criticized the dissent’s method of statutory interpretation to avoid a
collision between state law and Rule 23, except in those cases where
the court may be interpreting an ambiguous federal rule to “avoid
substantial variations between state and federal litigation.”157 The
opinion considered class action litigation as a tool of litigation
aggregation altering “only how the claims are processed.”158
Though lacking a majority regarding the scope of rulemaking
power under the Enabling Act,159 the plurality opined that a Federal
Rule is valid if the rule actually regulates procedure, defined as “the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them.”160 To make this determination, the
analytical focus should be on the Federal Rules themselves, not their
effect on individual litigants.161 Writing for a plurality of four
justices, Justice Scalia read Sibbach to overrule Gasperini.162 Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion held that even state procedural rules
“bound up with substantive rights could be displaced by [the]

151. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006).
152. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397.
153. Id. at 398.
154. Id. at 399–400.
155. See id. at 395–96 (Scalia J., plurality); id. at 1448 (Stephens, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with dissenting opinion’s approach but not in agreement on
the result reached by the dissent.)
156. Id. at 404–05.
157. Id. at 405 n.7.
158. Id. at 408.
159. Id. at 406; see also Thomas, supra note 128, at 213.
160. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 394 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, 14 (1941)); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965); Burlington N.
R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987).
161. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410.
162. Thomas, supra note 128, at 213
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Federal Rules.”163 The plurality also accused Justice Stevens’
concurrence of “wanting effectively to overrule Sibbach rather than
to apply it.”164
The Stevens concurrence shared the analytical approach of the
dissent but arrived at the opposite conclusion.165 With the Rules
Enabling Act, Stevens noted, Congress restricted the Supreme Court
from promulgating “procedural rules that interfere with state
substantive law.”166 Stevens interpreted that restriction as support for
the proposition that federal procedure may not displace how a state
chooses to define “its own rights or remedies.”167 Justice Stevens
therefore advocated interpreting the Federal Rules “with sensitivity”
to state interests and policies, despite signing on to parts of the
majority opinion that labeled this very inquiry “standardless.”168
For Stevens, the distinction between substantive and procedural
state law hinged not on the law’s form,169 but “on whether the state
law actually is part of a State’s framework of substantive rights or
remedies.”170 In Shady Grove, Justice Stevens found the New York
statute so generic as to apply to class action suits to recover penalties
brought in New York for other jurisdiction’s laws, where such suits
are permitted.171 Further, he noted the law’s legislative history
lacked “particularly strong evidence,” indicating that New York
“wished to create a ‘limitation’ on New York’s ‘statutory
damages.’”172 Additionally, Justice Stevens noted that some state
procedural rules “must apply in diversity cases because they
function as part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and
remedies.”173 That a procedural device makes “litigation easier”
does not alter who may obtain or how much an individual plaintiff
may obtain via the statutorily created remedy.174 Thus, Stevens
thought the state law in Shady Grove was not a part of New York’s
163. Id.
164. Doernberg, supra note 127, at 1162.
165. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416–17 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 418.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 405 n.7 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 427 n.7 (1996)); see also Thomas, supra note 128, at 213.
169. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In our federalist
system, Congress has not mandated that federal courts dictate to state legislatures
the form that their substantive law must take.”).
170. Id. at 419.
171. Id. at 434.
172. Id. at 432, 434 (quoting id. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); see also
Stempel, supra note 144, at 937–55 (conducting a thorough review of legislative
history of the New York statute).
173. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 416−17 (Stevens, J., concurring).
174. Id. at 435.
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substantive rights and remedies and was therefore subject to
displacement by federal procedural rules in a diversity suit.175
Writing for four in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg relied on the
Court’s precedent and accused the majority of departing “radically”
from that precedent.176 Seeking to interpret Rule 23 “with sensitivity
to state interests,”177 the dissent sidestepped the collision of federal
and state procedure, finding Rule 23 “prescribes the considerations
relevant to class certification . . . but it does not command that a
particular remedy be available.”178 Justice Ginsburg read section
901(b) as a substantive limitation on damages and Rule 23 to only
facilitate efficient litigation.179 In Justice Ginsburg’s view, Rule 23
“governs procedural aspects of class litigation, but allows state law
to control” the monetary remedy.180
Described by one commentator as the “most significant Erie
opinion of the relatively young twenty-first century,”181 Shady
Grove pitted the functional approach, which gives high deference to
state law, against the formalist approach, which empowers the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within the federal court system.
The Scalia plurality took an “aggressive view that federal procedural
rules eject contrary state procedural codes, even where they embody
substantive state law or policy, so long as the federal rule is actually
procedural and on point.”182 Changes to the Supreme Court bench
since the decision leave uncertainty as to the how the Court would
rule if the issue was reargued under the current Court. One thing
remains certain; namely, divisions amongst the Supreme Court
Justices over Erie questions “leave[] litigants, lawyers, and
policymakers uncertain as to precisely when their state laws will or
will not displace a federal civil rule in federal court.”183 This
uncertainty should be unsettling for state legislatures using
procedural rules to advance substantive state policy goals.
Louisiana sits within the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
How the Fifth Circuit interprets and applies Shady Grove will
determine the fate of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
1563(A)(1).
175. Id. at 435−36.
176. Id. at 437 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 442 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415, 427
n.7 (1996)).
178. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 446.
179. Doernberg, supra note 127, at 1167 (quoting Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at
447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
180. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 446–47.
181. Stempel, supra note 144, at 908.
182. Id. at 910.
183. Id. at 911–12.
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C. Shady Grove’s Shadow Reaches New Orleans
Only one reported decision has come down from the U.S. Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals addressing conflicting federal and state law
since Shady Grove was decided, All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants.184
In All Plaintiffs, antitrust class action settlement checks mailed to
plaintiff class members were returned or not cashed by the
recipients.185 The district court decided to use the unclaimed funds
to impose a cy pres186 award payable to the University of Texas.187
The State of Texas intervened, asserting that under Texas unclaimedproperty laws,188 the state was entitled to those unclaimed funds
mailed to Texas citizens.189 Texas asserted that its Unclaimed
Property Act was substantive state law that did not conflict with
federal procedure.190 The opposition argued that FRCP 23(e), which
grants broad authority for approval of class action settlements,
makes a district court’s decision regarding disbursement of funds
applicable to the plaintiff class, regardless of Texas’s claim to the
property.191
The court observed that the scope of a federal rule must be
determined first.192 This threshold determination is to ascertain if the
rule’s scope is overly broad, as to cause a direct collision with state
law, or is controlling on the issue before the court.193 In analyzing
the scope of the rule, a court must consider the “plain meaning of
the Rule’s language.”194 Where a direct collision is found, the
Federal Rule must be applied “as long as that Rule is a valid
exercise of Congress’s rulemaking authority.”195 If this “initial
inquiry is not determinative[,]” only then will the court “wade into
the ‘murky waters’ of Erie itself.”196
184. All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2011).
185. Id. at 330.
186. Id. at 332 n.1 (“Cy pres refers to the proposition . . . that where
distribution to the class who should ideally receive a fund is impracticable or
inappropriate, the distribution should be made in the next best fashion in order as
closely as possible to approximate the intended disposition.”) (citing Wilson v.
Sw. Airlines, Inc., 880 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
187. Id. at 330.
188. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 72.001−74.710 (West 2012).
189. All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 331.
190. Id. at 332.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 333.
193. Id. (quoting Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1987).
194. All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 333 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980)).
195. Id. (citing Burlington N. R.R., 480 U.S. at 4–5).
196. Id. (citing Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398).
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The court first distinguished Shady Grove on the basis that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) “contain[ed] no categorical rule
entitling plaintiffs to cy pres distribution.”197 Rather, it “merely
empower[ed] a district court to approve a settlement.”198 Too broad of
a reading of Rule 23(e) would have been be required to conclude that
the rule “implicitly occupie[d] the field that the [Texas] Act seeks to
regulate.”199
The Fifth Circuit then proceeded under the traditional Erie
analysis, turning to the “twin aims” of Erie.200 The court concluded
that the portions of the Act that are “arguably procedural are plainly
‘bound up’ with ‘state-created rights and obligations.’”201 The act
grants to the state “an enforceable property right in the income from
unclaimed property.”202 The Fifth Circuit found the district court erred
in disregarding the Unclaimed Property Act and Texas property law
because both were substantive law.203
Note that the Fifth Circuit followed the framework of the Scalia
plurality opinion. The state substantive goals of the Texas Unclaimed
Property Law were only important where there was no federal
procedural rule on point.204 The federal rule was not read so broadly
as to control the issue;205 therefore, there was no direct collision, and,
in such a case, the traditional Erie twin-aims analysis is necessary.206
III. THE FATE OF LOUISIANA’S ACT 754 IN FEDERAL COURT
Understanding Shady Grove and its application in the Fifth Circuit
by way of All Plaintiffs is the key to understanding article
1563(A)(1)’s fate in federal court. Recall that federal courts follow
federal procedure, but apply state substantive law. As discussed in the
prior section, the court first determines if a federal rule controls the
issue. Only if the rule fails that test will any analysis of the state rule
be conducted.207
Louisiana Act 754 of 2012 created Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 1563(A)(1), which allows a party to make a limited
197. Id.at 333.
198. Id. at 334.
199. Id. at 335.
200. Id. at 336–37.
201. Id. at 337 (quoting Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. 356 U.S. 525, 535
(1958)).
202. All Plaintiffs, 645 F.3d at 337.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 334−37.
205. Id. at 335.
206. Id. at 335−37.
207. Id. at 333 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9
(1980)).
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admission of liability for evaluating and remediating the alleged
contamination.208 It is important to understand that this is an actual
admission, but the purposes to which the admission may be used are
limited by article 1563(A)(1). This limited admission allows a
defendant to make an admission, while effectively conditioning the
admission as only applicable to a specific remedy. Under Federal
Rule 36, a party’s admission of liability “establishes, conclusively, a
legally operative truth.”209 A party may partially deny or qualify an
admission,210 but once admitted, the matter is “conclusively
established.”211 Federal procedural rules deem admissions as
including those things admitted at oral arguments or in the pleadings
of the parties,212 which to be effective at limiting the disputed issues,
must give litigants reliability that an admitted matter is not in
dispute.213 Parties are not free to make conditional or partial
admissions.214
A. Federal Rule 36 Collides with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1563
The initial step is to determine if the plain meaning of the federal
law has a sufficiently broad scope that it directly collides with article
1563(A)(1) and controls the issue before the court.215 The plain
language of the Rule is read to determine its coverage of the particular
issue216 without reading the Rule to avoid a conflict with state law.217
208. La. Act No. 754 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View
Document.aspx?d=812233.
209. Dillon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 161 F.3d 8, at *2 (5th Cir. 1998).
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(4).
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b).
212. See, e.g., United States v. One Heckler−Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250, 1253
(7th Cir. 1980) (considering statements made in a party’s brief as an admission for
ruling on a motion for summary judgment); McKinley v. Afram Lines (USA) Co.,
834 F. Supp. 510, 512–13 (D. Mass. 1993); see also 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2722 (3d ed. 2013) (“[A]dmissions
need not be pursuant to rule 36.”).
213. See American Auto. Ass’n v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke,
P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991).
214. See, e.g., Matz v. Household Int’l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, No.
96−C−1095, 2009 WL 3242298, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2009) (“Plaintiff should
expressly admit or deny the entirety of a request; it cannot offer only partial or
conditional admissions or denials.”).
215. See All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 333 (citing Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–70 (1965)).
216. Id. at 333 (citing Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9
(1980)).
217. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 442–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Glenn S. Koppel, The Fruits of
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This plain reading reveals that Rule 36, in direct contrast to article
1563, provides that any matter admitted is “conclusively
established.”218 To be effective, admissions must give litigants the
ability to rely on what is admitted.219 Article 1563(A)(1) seeks to limit
the admission of liability for environmental damage so as “not [to] be
construed as an admission of liability” for environmental damage that
is not specifically covered by Title 30, Section 29 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes.220 Article 1563(A)(1) speaks to the same issue as
Rule 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—the effect of an
admission as between the parties to the litigation.
Under article 1563(A)(1), an opposing party may admit to a
contested legal issue, but the article seeks to restrict that admissions
effect and use. Conclusively establishing a contested issue of fact is
an express feature of Rule 36. This conclusive establishment is the
very core of the admissions’ legal effect. This effect permits litigants
to rely on what is admitted and remove otherwise contested issues
from dispute. Conditioning the admission, so that the admitted fact
must still be proven by an opposing party to the litigation, necessarily
means that the admitted fact has not been conclusively established.
Thus, by operation of an article 1563(A)(1) admission, no legal issues
are, in actuality, removed from dispute, as nothing is actually
conclusively established. This lack of conclusive establishment limits
the effectiveness of an admission in federal court and creates a direct
collision with the plain language of Rule 36 and its purpose.
This analysis is in line with post-Shady Grove appellate cases,
finding a direct collision between federal and state procedure. Jones v.
United Parcel Services, Inc. found federal common law, which
permitted submitting punitive damages to the jury, in direct conflict
with the state law requiring the court determine the issue in a separate
proceeding.221 There, the collision occurred not in the plain text of
Rule 38,222 but concerned a prior Supreme Court decision that
squarely held the following: “under federal common law, juries

Shady Grove: Seeing the Forest for the Trees, 44 AKRON L. REV. 999, 1002
(2011).
218. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b).
219. See American Auto. Ass’n v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke,
P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991).
220. La. Act No. 754 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View
Document.aspx?d=812233.
221. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1202, 1206 (10th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 413 (2012).
222. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) (“The right of trial by jury as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is
preserved to the parties inviolate.”).
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determined issues relating to punitive damages.”223 That a rule
collision may be based on jurisprudential decisions interpreting a
Federal Rule supports the conclusion that a collision exists between
article 1563(A)(1) and jurisprudential rules discussed above. As prior
court cases interpreting Rule 36 have broadly read this rule, a court
should look to those cases to determine if Rule 36 occupies the field
in such a manner to displace article 1563(A)(1).
One Louisiana district court has written a post-Shady Grove
opinion finding that, while federal and state procedural rules may
have a “commonality of purpose,” there must be evidence of a clear
intention of federal exclusivity for a collision to occur.224 Secondly,
where a state rule imposes an additional burden on the litigants, so
long as the “burdens and standards imposed . . . directly correspond
with the burdens and standards [of a Federal Rule],” no collision
occurs.225
At a basic level, both article 1563’s and the Federal Rules’
mandates concerning admissions serve a common purpose: allowing
parties to reduce litigation costs by eliminating undisputed facts from
contention. However, article 1563’s effects are different from the
effects of an admission in federal court.226 Under the federal rules on
the matter, a party’s admission removes the burden from the other
party of proving that which is admitted, whereas if a defendant makes
an admission under article 1563, this burden remains. The admission
does not conclusively establish that which is admitted, as article 1563
makes the admission conditional. Louisiana’s Code of Civil
Procedure thus imposes a burden not imposed under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; namely, a party must prove that which was
previously admitted by an opposing party. Where the state procedural
rule imposes burden on the litigants, that burden must “directly
correspond” with the federal burden.227 Here, the burdens imposed by
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1563 do not correspond in
this manner, and state procedure collides with the federal.
A prior district court opinion found no collision between Federal
Rule 56 and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 971, which
stayed discovery until the plaintiff showed a probability of success on

223. Jones, 674 F.3d at 1202 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S.
1, 16 (1991)).
224. La. Crisis Assistance Ctr. v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 827 F. Supp. 2d 668,
676 (E.D. La. 2011) (“The Court finds no evidence that these rules were intended
to apply so broadly that they control the issue.”).
225. Id. at 679.
226. See supra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
227. La. Crisis Assistance Ctr., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 679.
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his claims.228 The court found no direct collision, as “Rule 56
summary judgment remains available to the parties and [the Louisiana
special motion to strike] permits the court to order specified discovery
where necessary,” similar to that allowed by Federal Rule 56.229 In
contrast, article 1563(A)(1)230 does not give the judiciary discretion to
find that the limited admission is conclusively established.
Article 1563(A)(1) seeks to limit the admission—or attach strings
to it—in ways not allowed by the Federal Rules. The two may not
coexist; this collision supports a finding of direct conflict.231 Also,
recall that the majority opinion in Shady Grove found the lack of
limitations on Rule 23 relevant and “resisted what it saw as New
York’s attempt to add an additional limitation to the Rule.”232 The fact
that article 1563(A)(1) seeks to attach a limitation on an admission
cuts against the plain language of Rule 36 and its purpose. The
Louisiana limited admission is not “a supplemental and substantive
rule to provide added protections” to the defendant;233 rather, it is an
attempt to directly speak to the purpose and effect of a party’s
admission, a field already occupied by federal procedural law in
federal court.
The federal court cannot apply the state limited admission
procedure while at the same time giving admissions a conclusive
effect, as the conclusiveness of an admission is not a discretionary
decision.234 Though the admission may not support that party’s
alternate theories of recovery or affirmative defenses, a court must
consider any admission as conclusively established.235 Further, even if
the admission may prevent the defendant from admitting evidence
228. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2013); Armington v. Fink, No.
09−6785, 2010 WL 743524, at *3 n.2 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2010) (citing Henry v.
Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 168−69 (5th Cir. 2009)).
229. Armington, 2010 WL 743524, at *3 n.2.
230. La. Act 754 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View
Document.aspx?d=812233.
231. Nuveen Mun. Trust ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v.
Withumsmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 302–04 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding a state
affidavit of merit filing requirement was able to coexist with federal filing
requirements, as the affidavit could be filed up to thirty days after the complaint,
thus it did not require an additional filing requirement above federal procedural
rules).
232. Doernberg, supra note 127, at 1169.
233. Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2010).
234. See Burke v. Air Serv. Int’l, Inc., 685 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding
there is no direct conflict where a Federal Rule permits expert testimony and a
district rule required expert testimony, as this discretion meant the Federal Rule
did not control the issue; therefore, the district rule requiring expert witness
testimony would apply).
235. Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 153–154 (5th Cir. 2007).
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that contradicts the admission of liability for environmental damages,
the court must still consider the admission conclusively established.236
In direct contrast, article 1563(A)(1) permits a party to make a
limited admission while not waiving any defenses.237 Given this
contrast, the two procedural rules directly collide and cannot coexist
within the same civil action. Secondly, where the federal rule makes
no limitation, a collision arises where the state rule is read to place a
limitation on the federal rule. Where two rules collide, the next
determination is if the rule is valid under the Enabling Act.238
B. Is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 Valid Under the Rules
Enabling Act?
Where a direct collision is found, the Federal Rule is applied “as
long as that Rule is a valid exercise of Congress’s rulemaking
authority.”239 The rule must “really regulate procedure, —the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them.”240 It is worth noting that the Supreme Court gives
a presumption of validity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
no rule has yet to be invalidated.241
Giving an admission a conclusive effect and disallowing the
limited admission may have “some practical effect on the parties’
rights,” but such a position “undeniably regulate[s] only the process
for enforcing those rights.”242 To Justice Stevens, the question is what
the rule itself regulates; in the case of Rule 36, the rule regulates the
conclusive effect of an admission and leaves the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief unaltered.243 The limited admission neither
236. See Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995);
American Auto. Ass’n Inc. v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, P.C., 930
F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991); Hinesville Bank v. Pony Express Courier Corp.,
868 F.2d 1532, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989) (Johnson, J., concurring) (citing 999 v.
C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866, 869–70 (9th Cir. 1985)).
237. La. Act 754 (2012), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/View
Document.aspx?d=812233.
238. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
239. All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 2011).
240. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
407 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
241. Id. at 407 (“[W]e have rejected every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule
that has come before us.”); Ides, supra note 122, at 57; see also Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
242. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 407.
243. See id. at 407–08 (“What matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it
governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’ rights are
‘enforced,’ it is valid.”).

200

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 2

provides an additional defense to the defendant, nor shifts the burden
of proof—both of which would constitute a potential “substantive
aspect[].”244
We might consider how scholars approach the issue. Professor
Carrington proposes that a rule is functionally procedural if the rule
pertains to federal court operation and is part of a system generally
applicable to all civil actions.245 A procedural rule is one “designed to
achieve ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ determinations.”246 The
conclusive effect of an admission is precisely what Professor
Carrington’s test defines as procedural. This effect is integrated into
the federal system, and generally applicable to all civil actions. The
conclusive effect removes undisputed issues and provides reliability
to the parties, expediting the civil dispute and reducing costs for
everyone involved.
In addition to Professor Carrington’s proposal, we might consider
Professor Doernberg’s approach. Doernberg advocates an “elements
approach,” where a court first asks “whether the state law and Federal
Rule at issue tend to establish or negate an element of the claimant’s
cause of action or a defense on the merits.”247 If the state law does
not, then the court must ask if the federal rule does.248 If the federal
law does, “it trenches upon [the Enabling Act’s] forbidden territory;
otherwise it is ‘procedural’ for [the Enabling Act’s] purposes and can
apply.”249 Applying Professor Doernberg’s approach, article
1563(A)(1) does not prove or negate an element of the cause of
action; it only seeks to restrict the purpose to which an admission of
the defendant can be used by the plaintiff in establishing an element
of his cause of action. On the federal side, the conclusive nature and
unrestricted use of an admission by the opposing party does not
establish or negate an element of a cause of action, nor does it
establish or negate defense on the merits. Using Professor
Doernberg’s elements approach, it is clear that Federal Rule 36 “is
‘procedural’ for [Enabling Act] purposes and can apply.”250
Justice Stevens advocated that one cannot determine if a federal
rule “impermissibly affects a substantive right without looking to the
source of the supposed right and considering whether the rightcreating sovereign sought to address substantive goals.”251 The
244. See, e.g., Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2010).
245. Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 308 (1989).
246. Id.
247. Doernberg, supra note 126, at 1185.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1173.
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purpose of the rule must be known, and “only the sovereign
establishing the rule can define that.”252 In the case of Louisiana’s
legacy litigation reform, the sovereign has established the rule’s
purpose: it is known from a decision in the highest court of the
sovereign.253 The purpose is also directly established by the sovereign
itself in legislation.254 While Justice Stevens no longer sits on the
Supreme Court, some courts have read his concurrence as
controlling.255 However, All Plaintiffs was decided by a Fifth Circuit
panel that followed the framework of the Shady Grove plurality.
District courts within the Fifth Circuit may be forced to follow this
framework until overruled by an en banc decision or faced with
binding Supreme Court precedent.256
The conclusive effect of an admission is grounded in federal
procedural law. The rule allows for cost effective litigation; parties
may focus on litigating the disputed issues. The pertinent Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure regulate only the procedure for enforcing
rights, and confer no substantive rights. Here, the conclusiveness of
an admission is within the scope of the Enabling Act, and thus Federal
Rule 36 is valid in all federal courts regardless of whether it conflicts
with state law to the contrary. Federal courts should not follow article
1563(A)(1).
CONCLUSION
In her recent article, Professor Margaret S. Thomas advocates a
restrained reading of the Federal Rules.257 Where a state procedural
rule actually regulates areas traditionally within the states’ police
powers, Professor Thomas cautions that “any targeted calibration of
tort liability using procedural mechanisms, may be swept aside by a
Federal Rule to the contrary.”258 As one commentator perfectly
252. Id. at 1174.
253. See M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 998 So. 2d 16, 35 (La. 2008).
254. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:29(A) (2013) (“It is the duty of the legislature
to set forth procedures . . . . [T]his section provides the procedure for judicial
resolution of claims for environmental damage to property.”).
255. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (holding that, where
there is no majority opinion, the holding may be viewed as the position taken by
concurring opinions on the narrowest grounds); see, e.g., Estate of C.A. v. Grier,
752 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
256. See Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A
panel of this court can only overrule a prior panel decision if ‘such overruling is
unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court precedent.’”) (quoting
Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United
States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 945 F.2d 1302, 1306 (5th Cir. 1991))).
257. Thomas, supra note 128, at 245–51.
258. Id. at 259.
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surmised, “Shady Grove provides a stark example of what can
happen when [state legislatures try] to reach a substantive
outcome—decreased liability for defendant businesses—by
tinkering with procedural mechanisms . . . .”259 Ultimately, when a
state rule collides with a federal rule, Shady Grove renders
procedural based tort reform ineffectual in federal court.
This procedural tinkering by the Louisiana Legislature to
address legacy litigation reform will fare the same as the substantive
policy choice of New York in Shady Grove. It will fail in federal
court. In this post-Shady Grove landscape, the Federal Rules’
supremacy over conflicting state procedure is unaffected by the state
substantive policy goals underlying the rule. Louisiana, and all other
states, should take great care in modifying state procedural rules to
advance state substantive policy.
Given the steps taken by Louisiana oil and gas producers in
response to Corbello,260 perhaps the “legacy” of Corbello is up for
debate. Louisiana policy makers must decide whether Corbello’s
story will be one of industry accountability and the sanctity of
freedom of contract between producers and landowners, or the tale
of an opportunistic and extortionist plaintiff’s bar. While the impact
and ultimate story of Corbello continues to take shape, it is clear
that—for the near future—state-level tort reform measures should
modify state substantive law and avoid procedural modifications. A
change to substantive law may be more difficult: it would involve
more political capital and might result in a more heavy-handed
solution. However, tort reform based on substantive law would
survive a trip to federal court.
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